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 Violence against Violence
 In Search of Security and Justice
 Carolien Jacobs
 Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
 Christy Schuetze
 Swarthmore College
 We're barricading the streets
 We're blocking the 'chapas'1
 Here nobody goes through
 Even the shops are closed
 If the police are violent
 We respond with violence ( What'?)
 Change the cause to change the consequence
 More than half of my salary goes to taxes and transport
 If my child gets sick, hisfate rests with chance
 Meanwhile your son is healthy and strong,
 Lives in affluence, lives the life of a lord
 Living here is a luxury, its cost is very high
 We work like slaves and give everything we have
 Lower the transport fares or raise the minimum wage
 Xiiiii... that's the least you should do
 Unless you wantfire in the petrol pumps
 Raids on the bakeries and the ministries, imagine
 Destroying your commercial banks, your mine
 Irrational governance contaminates it seems.
 Now they askfor what?... Consideration
 You should consider then, before doing this shit
 Of raising the costs of living
 And keeping our incomes low
 This government really doesn't improve itself. ..No
 There will really be a tragedy... Yes
 Really...
 Let them come with tear gas
 The strike isfull of oxygen
 They can't stop our task
 I will fight, I won't abstain.2
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 In recent years, Mozambique has been the site of
 numerous outbreaks of violence in the form of popular
 justice as well as large-scale acts of public protest. In
 2008, this reportedly caused 54 deaths,3 in 2009 78.4 In
 this paper, we analyze both these violent non-state
 phenomena and examine their roots and meanings. We
 set out some factors that contribute to the widely felt
 need for what people call justice with their own hands'
 and the violence often implicated in it. Making use of
 ethnographic material, we aim to illuminate the
 perspective ofMozambican citizens, who, as non-state
 actors, engage in violence with the aim of obtaining
 more acceptable levels of justice and security and there
 fore enforce the imposition of their own normative
 orders. This violence can be aimed at achieving both
 socio-economic and criminal justice, which people
 view as inadequately provided by the state.
 In our analysis, we use a legal pluralist perspective,
 meaning that in our discussion of law we include other
 normative orders than state law, acknowledging 'the
 theoretical possibility of more than one legal order or
 mechanism within one socio-political space, based on
 different sources of ultimate validity and maintained
 by forms of organization other than the state' (Von
 Benda-Beckmann 2002: 37). Hence, it is not neces
 sarily state law which is made and preserved; people
 also have the power to change orders other than that of
 the state. This point of departure helps us to consider
 how, through the use of violence, non-state actors are
 able to make and preserve law, both in a strict sense
 and in a legal pluralist sense. We argue that the protests
 and the acts of vigilante justice are forms of'subjective
 violence' which are both reactions to the objective, or
 'systemic violence' (Zizek 2008) that people experi
 18
 enee. Subjective violence here, is seen as a perturbation
 of the "normal," peaceful state of things' whereas
 objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to
 this "normal" state of things' {ibid. : 2). The latter, then,
 is the violence widely seen to be caused by the negli
 gence and greed of state actors. A state's response to
 subjective violence can be just as well subjective, some
 thing which Zizek hardly takes into account. Looking
 at the outcome of the 'subjective' forms of non-state
 violence from our legal pluralist perspective, we argue
 that, although the recent vigilante justice and large
 scale public protests are extralegal in a strict sense, in
 the end, they might have both 'lawmaking' and 'law
 preserving capacities,' and are able to affect state policy
 and change other normative orders (Benjamin 2004:
 241). Following Black, we consider the forms of collec
 tive violence not necessarily as crime, but as 'self-help'
 and a form of 'social control' (Black 1983) offering
 alternative forms of social and normative order 'despite
 the state' (Von Benda-Beckmann and Pirie 2007: 4).
 Violence is a relative concept and depends on one's
 perspective. Under certain circumstances, violence is
 considered by non-state actors as a 'moral means' to
 'just ends' (Benjamin 2004: 236). Thus, although
 certain acts might be illegal, they are not necessarily
 considered illegitimate by most citizens. The imposi
 tion of violent forms of justice by non-state actors and
 the degree to which this justice is accepted by the
 population underline that sovereignty is not monopo
 lized by the state, but can also be 'fragmented' (Gazit
 2009; Davis 2010) or 'multiple' (Bertelsen 2009). It has
 been argued by Benjamin, that '[a]ll violence as a
 means is either lawmaking or law-preserving. If it lays
 claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all
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 validity' (2004: 243). In this regard, the making and
 preservation of law can also come from non-state
 violence, but only if the latter is used as a means to an
 end.
 In the following, we first turn to the song high
 lighted at the beginning of this paper. From there, we
 move on to discuss the linkage between socio
 economic and human insecurity and the violence
 entailed in acts to reduce this insecurity. Next, we
 move on to the local level of Gorongosa, a rural district
 in central Mozambique. We discuss several cases to
 show that the use of collective violence can be under
 stood as people's efforts to increase levels of security
 and impose popular justice when the state is not
 adequately providing them. In this part of the paper
 our focus is mainly on the experiences and responses
 of the people toward injustice and insecurity. After
 these cases, we shift our focus more toward the state to
 discuss some of the partnerships the state is seeking
 with non-state authorities in an effort to curb the
 violence and keep control in society. First, we focus on
 church leaders who seem to be both well equipped and
 willing to act as a source of normative and cognitive
 orientation for people as well as for the state. Spirit
 mediums constitute a specific category of religious
 leaders. Their capacities make them especially apt
 partners in cases that involve witchcraft and violently
 expressed witchcraft accusations. Finally, we provide
 an outlook on the future and discuss further strategies
 the state is exploring to ensure lawmaking and law
 preserving acts remain in their own hands.
 People's protest: a song
 The lyrics cited at the start of this paper come from a
 song (originally in Portuguese) by Azagaia, a Mozam
 bican popular musician. The lines clearly capture ways
 in which recent large-scale riots and vigilante justice in
 Mozambique have been conceived of as a form of
 communication directed to state officials at large.
 Azagaia wrote the song in the aftermath of violent
 protests against the government which took place in
 Mozambique's capital, Maputo, in early February
 2008.5 The protests were popularly referred to as the
 Lchapa strikewhereas government accounts tellingly
 described them as 'riots'. The violence emerged in
 response to the government's plans to increase the fares
 of semi-public transport in the city of Maputo by fifty
 to one hundred percent.6 Frustrated by price increases
 that made it even more difficult for people to sustain
 precarious lives, many of Maputo's urban and peri
 urban dwellers took to the streets. With burning tires
 they blocked most major roads and paralyzed public
 transport in the city, bringing most business to a halt.7
 The protests were vehemently repressed by the police.
 In the ensuing violence, at least five people were killed
 and more than a hundred injured, many of them hit by
 bullets fired from the guns of state officials.The protests
 appeared to be effective as, soon after, the government
 revoked its new policy, implementing fuel subsidies for
 private chapas operating in the capital.8
 Azagaia's words echo a common sentiment that had
 been simmering below the surface in crowded informal
 urban neighborhoods in the country, but that never
 came to expression until the chapa protests. All at once
 - or so it seemed from the outside - Maputo erupted
 19
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 in a massive protest against both the government and
 the ruling Frelimo party, which, for many are one and
 the same; in speech, citizens, but also party members
 and state officials, often use the words 'government',
 party', and 'Frelimo' interchangeably. It should be
 noted here that Maputo is a city that had, since inde
 pendence, been considered a stronghold of Frelimo.
 Although politically Maputo can be considered as the
 centre' of the Mozambican state, the protesters gave a
 voice to a feeling of being very much 'at the margins'
 (Das and Poole 2004), feeling invisible and unheard. In
 reality, the protests had been in the air already for a
 longer time.
 Remarking on the 2005 riots in suburban Paris,
 Zizek noted that '[t]he riots were simply a direct effort
 to gain visibility (Zizek 2008: 77). In Maputo, many
 citizens described the strike as a wake-up call, helping
 people to realize they could take matters in their own
 hands when the rising cost of living had become intol
 erable. 'People here, already for a long time, feared the
 government. [The strike] awakened people to recog
 nize [that they have] what is called popular power', as a
 citizen explained to us. Indeed, soon after the chapa
 strike, 'copy-cat' riots emerged in other places.9 In
 Mozambique, just like in Paris and more recently in the
 Arab world, patterns of violence have both made the
 concerns of marginal populations impossible for state
 actors to ignore, and have been self-perpetuating,
 calling others to engage in public protest to make their
 concerns visible and to pressure government leaders to
 make significant changes to the status quo.
 As Azagaia's lyrics illustrate, the protesters felt there
 was no other way than violence to call attention to their
 concerns and question more latent or everyday forms of
 20
 violence from the side of the state. In the following, we
 discuss the underlying causes of the violence. We set
 out that these are, in part, related to the particularities
 of the state's socio-economic policy in the post-war
 context. Another, related explanation for Mozambican
 citizens' use of violence lies in people's experiences with
 a weak formal justice system and a police force that is
 not able to provide an acceptable degree of public order.
 Facing the inadequacies of the institutions charged
 with providing and ensuring justice and order, people
 feel it is legitimate to take matters of justice into their
 own hands.
 From socio-economic justice to criminal
 justice
 To understand the roots of the chapa strike, it is impor
 tant to briefly shed light on the wider socio-economic
 and historical context in which the protests took place.
 Beginning in the mid 1980's, Mozambique's ruling
 party, Frelimo, has increasingly abandoned its socialist
 agenda, proving, over time, to be a willing disciple of
 the neo-liberal development model advocated by the
 IMF, World Bank and other transnational donor agen
 cies.10 Since taking up Structural Adjustment Programs,
 Mozambique has become known as the 'donor darling'
 of Southern Africa, at times receiving more than 55
 percent of its annual budget funding from international
 agencies.11 A quick glance at statistics shows that
 Mozambique is 'developing' rapidly as real GDP
 growth since 1993 has averaged 8.1% (Games 2007: 9).
 At the same time, there is a growing sense among
 the population that possibilities for personal prosperity
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 and wellbeing have evaporated. Despite positive
 macroeconomic growth, a large part of the population
 is falling deeper into poverty and the ground under
 those with a middle-income is increasingly shaky and
 volatile (cf. Hanlon and Smart 2008). According to a
 survey by Afrobarometer, in 2005, 50% of Mozam
 bicans were positive about the country's economic
 conditions, whereas in 2008 only 37% of the popula
 tion responded positively about it (Afrobarometer
 2010). The unfolding Hiv/AiDS-crisis and lack of
 employment contribute further to disillusionment,
 especially among youth. Compounding this situation,
 high inflation rates make many basic consumer goods,
 like rice, bread and corn, increasingly unaffordable. It is
 important to note here that at the end of the civil war
 in 1992 people had hopes of better futures. Today
 however, people frequently complain about the contin
 uation of suffering, with older people reminiscing about
 the pre-independence period, when Portuguese colonial
 power holders were strict but at least applied severe
 punishment to criminals, when prices of basic consumer
 goods were affordable, and when the youth respected
 their elders.
 Increasing misfortune suffered by the majority of
 the population plays a role in the steady erosion of the
 states legitimacy, contributing to the increasing inci
 dents of public protest. But in malfunctioning states, it
 is not only socio-economic security which is at stake,
 but also human security. People experience threats to
 their lives from many sides, holding the state account
 able for removing or containing these threats. If the
 state does not do so, people might resort to extralegal
 means to increase their own feelings of security and
 obtain the desired levels of order in society.
 One of the direct responses to the violent chapa
 strike in Maputo was an event which we observed in
 the central city of Chimoio several days later. The
 incident clearly showed there is a link between collec
 tive violence in the form of riots related to economic
 security, and in the form of 'private justice' (Henry
 1983). Incited by the sudden realization that they
 could take matters of justice in their own hands, an
 angry crowd spontaneously took to Chimoio's police
 station in an attempt to seize twelve suspected crimi
 nals who had been captured by the police the day
 before. The gang had been terrorizing the peri-urban
 neighborhoods for years and people had grown tired of
 living in fear. Eager to bring the suspects to justice
 and distrustful of the police's competence, the crowd
 converged to raid the police station and publicly burn
 several of the thieves. By the end of the day, six people
 had died in the violence, including one police officer,
 several police vehicles were damaged, and the police
 station was ravaged.12 Public reactions we encountered
 that day in Chimoio revealed that many people noted
 a direct link between the strike in Maputo in which
 people protested about socio-economic injustice, and
 the acts in Chimoio in which the state's criminal justice
 system was questioned. When rumors about the uproar
 started to gain ground in Chimoio, most people took
 them as yet another follow-up of the Maputo strike,
 which underlines that the protests in Maputo had
 served as a catalyst, inciting other quests for justice. In
 both situations, violence was used to fight violence.
 21
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 Collective violence as a response to the
 failure of the state's order
 People know that it is against the law to apply justice
 with their own hands, ... but ... if the one who
 should apply the law no longer acknowledges the
 law as such ... then people can apply the law them
 selves, right? (Mozambican citizen, 28, male).
 Having set out the wider context of violence in
 Mozambique, we will now examine collective violence
 from a micro-perspective drawing on ethnographic
 research in the rural district of Gorongosa, located in
 central Mozambique. Our findings provide more
 evidence that people in Mozambique perceive recent
 public protests and forms of popular justice in Mozam
 bique as a direct response to pervasive objective violence
 from the side of the state. During the course of our
 research in Gorongosa, we encountered many instances,
 albeit at a much smaller scale, not only of people taking
 justice into their own hands, but also of people experi
 encing shortcomings of the states provisioning of
 security and order. Once people observe that the law is
 not preserved adequately or needs to be shaped differ
 ently, they decide to take matters in their own hands
 and either apply their own laws or follow their own
 procedures to apply the laws of the state.
 Gorongosa is an interesting microcosm of what is
 happening in the rest of the country. Since the end of
 the civil war, the district's capital has been undergoing
 rapid growth. Informal neighborhoods are quickly
 expanding, disparity of wealth is growing, and kinship
 ties are becoming looser. As a result, relationships
 between people become less multi-stranded and levels
 22
 of trust lower. No longer living in a war-torn country,
 people are now expecting society to be better organized
 than before. They are tired of having nightly fears of
 gangs of thieves with machetes or firearms. People
 frequently deplore the recent failure of the justice
 system in comparison to its effectiveness in the past.
 Older Mozambicans often express longing for colonial
 times when thieves were effectively contained by
 authorities and punishments were more severe. Signifi
 cantly, even one of the elected lay judges of the district's
 state court,13 who was closely involved in the adminis
 tration of justice himself, referred back to colonial times
 with nostalgia when he talked about one of the former
 district administrators: 'He was tough, but he taught us
 good things. ... Somebody stealing, would get caught
 immediately.' After these words, he switched to the
 present tense again and said:
 Today it is not like that and you'd better do justice
 with your own hands. Some time ago, there was a
 thief that came here at midnight, then he went
 stealing at some other places and later came back
 again to try to steal more at my place. I caught the
 thief and beat him all night long. This thief... aaahh
 ... he is now staying at home because he is still
 suffering from the injuries he got from me. He went
 to the police to complain about his injuries, but
 there they asked him who caused the injuries and he
 told them it was me, because he had been stealing.
 They sent the thief home but did not call me. The
 judge [the judge-president of the district court] told
 me I should not have treated the thief myself, but it
 is justice.
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 A situation in which even the bearers of justice resort to
 'self-help' as a means of 'social control' (Black 1983)
 rather than calling the police, reveals the depth of
 people's distrust in state authorities. In such a context,
 citizens might consider it legitimate to take justice in
 their own hands. '[Such vigilante justice] expresses the
 rage people feel about their lack of security', as an
 informant told us. The following three examples
 provide more evidence of how people lose trust in the
 state's apparatus of justice and control and subsequently
 resort to their own means of normative ordering,
 applying their own laws, or enforcing state law according
 to their own procedures. The first case illustrates how
 public opinion regarding insecurity and injustice is
 being shaped. The second case elucidates how people
 are brought to take justice in their own hands, needing
 only a small trigger and no large-scale organization.
 The third case discusses the specific category of the
 quintessential criminal who brings chronic fear and
 terror to communities, supposedly aided by nefarious
 magical forces and whose actions seem to demand more
 drastic measures than state officials are able to provide.
 Partners in crime: perceptions of state officials
 Over there, at the bus stop ..., in the mornings and
 afternoons, there's lots of theft. And the thief is
 never caught. Why? After stealing, they go there to
 [name of restaurant nearby], and have breakfast
 together with the police. You see? So, they eat
 together.
 The informant cited above gives a hint of people's
 perceptions about malfunctioning of the police. The
 following case which took place at the district police
 station illuminates further how widespread convictions
 that the police work in partnership with criminals are
 based on people's direct experiences.14 In this case, a
 woman came to the police to register a complaint that
 her brother had stolen lots of goods from her house.15
 She was in town when one of her children rushed over
 to tell her that he had just watched her brother empty
 her house of all its valuables. When the woman made
 her complaint to the police, she explained that her
 brother had been released from prison the day before.
 While she was presenting her case, the two police
 officers interrupted her and confirmed that the man
 indeed had a reputation of being a thief and had been
 imprisoned at least five times.
 Once she had finished stating her complaint, one of
 the police officers sighed while taking his mobile phone
 out of his pocket. In the list of contacts saved on his
 mobile phone, he looked up a number and then placed
 a call to the alleged thief. The police officer asked the
 man whether he knew anything about goods which
 had been stolen from his sister's house. The man on the
 other side apparently responded that he did not know
 anything about it, at which time the officer did not
 insist but simply ended the conversation and told the
 woman her brother denied having stolen her property.
 Subsequently, the police officer asked her whether she
 still wanted to make an official complaint and take the
 case to court. She confirmed, explaining that her
 husband was getting fed up with her brother as well.
 The officers on duty told her to compile a list of all the
 stolen goods and give the estimated value of each item:
 two bed covers of 500 Mt each, a mattress of 200 Mt,
 et cetera.
 23
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 While she was elaborating the list of stolen goods,
 one of the people in the waiting room asked her how
 one person could carry so many large items alone. One
 of the policemen laughed and, with clear admiration in
 his voice, replied that the accused thief was truly pau
 forte, 'strong wood' and would indeed be able to carry
 such a load. His colleague agreed. The officers consid
 ered the case closed and sent the woman on her way,
 even though she was clearly discontent with the way
 she had been attended.
 This case provides a glimpse into how people's
 perceptions about the weakness of the state systems of
 justice and security in Mozambique are being shaped.
 Narratives of such incidents enter social networks and
 circulate widely. They then become the basis for
 further speculation and are continually reinforced,
 leading many people to conclude that their only
 recourse to restore order is through popular justice.
 After witnessing this case, for instance, our research
 assistant later voiced his suspicions that when the
 woman's brother was released from prison, he must
 have been ordered by the policemen to procure certain
 goods. Our assistant suspected that the police officers'
 request for a list of the stolen goods was merely a way
 for them to confirm the value of the goods that they
 would be receiving. The observation that the police
 officer was in the possession of the phone number of a
 renowned thief affirms people's feeling that thieves are
 working in partnership with the police. It shows how
 people's experiences with the police apparatus give rise
 to feelings of insecurity and being unprotected.
 24
 'The police were ori lunch break': private justice and
 the preservation of law
 In the following case we will look into the consequences
 that follow from a perceived failure of state authorities.
 A man named Celestino had been called to trial at the
 district court for having severely abused a man he
 suspected of stealing three plates and a pan. In the
 courtroom, Celestino was asked to give his reasons for
 punishing the thief himself, rather than turning him
 over to the authorities. In a matter of fact response,
 Celestino shrugged his shoulders, commenting: 'I
 called the police, but they said they were having lunch
 and that I had to wait. So we decided to start interro
 gating him by ourselves.' According to Celestino, the
 suspect already had a reputation in the neighborhood
 for being a thief. His neighbors had already repeatedly
 caught him stealing. Each time, he had been sent to
 prison, and each time he was quickly released, and
 always returned to stealing. The cycle had been repeated
 so many times that residents of the area - Celestino
 included - were exasperated. After the thief had been
 caught by Celestino's household servant, neighbors
 quickly gathered and tied the suspect's hands and feet
 with bicycle tubes and pierced his hands with a fork,
 leading to permanent damage and numbness. According
 to Celestino's testimony, the crowd that was involved
 wanted to start beating the man as well, but he ordered
 them to wait for the police. During the court proceed
 ings, Celestino did not show any signs of regret. Rather,
 his behavior and his words revealed his certainty that
 he had acted in a just manner.
 A sense of righteousness in the pursuit of justice, as
 Celestino displayed, characterizes even the most
 severely violent cases of popular justice that have been
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.11 on Mon, 30 Oct 2017 13:50:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 reported in Mozambique. In acting quickly and harshly
 to punish or terminate harmful individuals, participants
 involved in acts of vigilante justice engage in what they
 see as a noble and selfless pursuit in the interest of the
 larger community (cf. Heald 1986; Abrahams 1998;
 Bertelsen 2009). They perceive themselves to be filling
 a gaping void of justice-seeking that state authorities
 have left open or do not fill in an adequate manner.
 Thus, the crime for which Celestino was put to trial
 was a sort of 'social control'; it was 'moralistic and
 involve[d] the pursuit of justice' (Black 1983: 34). It
 can be considered as a form of'self-help' (Black 1983)
 in which the laws of the state were preserved by acts of
 the population rather than by acts of the state.
 Since feelings of insecurity are widely shared, people
 quickly understand the need for intervention and are
 willing to join. Under these circumstances, there is no
 need for a clearly identifiable authority to carry out
 'law-preserving'acts. Small triggers can suffice to incite
 the ad hoc formation of an acting crowd, even without
 prior organization or mobilization. Such cases occur
 especially in areas where there are observed patterns of
 thefts and where police intervention and arrests either
 do not happen, or do not remove or reform the threat
 ening individuals for the long term. In these contexts,
 people continuously live in fear of being the next victim.
 Such fears, which are magnified by the feeling that the
 police do not act adequately, legitimate the use of
 violence even in cases in which the alleged criminal has
 committed relatively minor offenses, such as stealing
 nothing more than three plates and a pan. In fact, not
 long before the aforementioned cases took place, a
 group of criminals had been attacking residents of
 Gorongosa's district capital on an almost nightly basis.
 In the recurrent pattern, a group of about eight to
 twelve people, armed with machetes, would break into
 people's houses, often seriously injuring people who
 displayed any resistance. Many people hypothesized
 that the police were involved in these incidents, a
 suspicion which was reinforced by cases of some of the
 most notorious thieves in the area repeatedly and
 seemingly miraculously escaping from prison. Such
 stories incite persistent fears among the population. In
 such a context, when people like Celestino catch a thief,
 they easily resort to violence to channel their own fears
 and frustrations about living in insecurity.
 If the police were effective in establishing order, it is
 reasonable to expect that Mozambicans would be
 willing to defer to the action of state authorities. Indeed,
 Celestino at first called on the police for assistance in
 vain, and later demanded restraint from the angry
 crowd so that they might await the intervention of
 state officials. In recent times, however, many Mozam
 bicans share a feeling that the justice system is not
 functioning properly, and thus, they resort to their own
 imposition of order. The worst incidents have turned
 into what is referred to popularly as linchamentos or
 'lynchings' that lead to the gruesome deaths of victims.
 This situation reveals popular 'questioning' of not only
 the state's claim to a monopoly on the use of force but
 also of the functioning of the state as provider of Values
 and codes' (Martins 1995: 299). Society is acting in
 such a way as to compensate for the state's shortcom
 ings (Martins 1995; Abrahams 1998). Mozambicans
 have not only targeted alleged criminals in collective
 violence, but they have also attacked key sites of the
 state's justice system, such as the police station in
 Chimoio. In such cases, it is not simply the targeted
 25
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 thief or criminal who serves as a 'scapegoat' epitomizing
 a greater evil (Girard 1986), but also individual officials
 who are directly addressed as representing the state.
 People's persistent feelings of insecurity bring them to
 violently attack even petty criminals. '[T]he persecu
 tors always convince themselves that a small number of
 people, or even a single individual, despite his relative
 weakness, is extremely harmful to the whole of society'
 {ibid.: 15). People are hardly able to change the state's
 system of justice, but they are able to follow their own
 - violent - procedures to apply state laws. This happens
 in a context in which people experience an extreme loss
 of social order' {ibid.: 12).
 Thieves and witchcraft: the case of Malisani
 In the popular imagination, the inefficacy of the state
 justice system is only partly a problem of police negli
 gence or partnerships with criminals, and a lack of
 resources. As one of the local government officials
 admitted to us: 'the police have a problem with lack of
 qualified staff; they do not have sufficient personnel to
 be effective.' Compounding the situation is the narrow
 range of actions the police take to address problems of
 public order. Measures such as arrest, fines and impris
 onment are widely understood by people to be inef
 fectual in containing the threat posed by certain types
 of individuals.
 One especially problematic category of anti-social
 individuals are people suspected of using witchcraft or
 other occult forces to carry out antisocial deeds
 including theft. Such accusations are often based on
 circumstantial rather than material evidence and diffi
 cult to adjudicate within the purview of statutory law,
 based largely on a 'Euromodernist' legacy (Comaroff
 26
 and Comaroff 2004). Thus, in a situation where
 citizens perceive witchcraft to be a real threat
 demanding drastic intervention, the unwillingness of
 state officials to directly address such concerns bolsters
 the sense that state authorities are impotent. This
 contributes to people's willingness to resort to private
 justice to eliminate significant threats. The following
 case presents the example of Malisani, an anti-social
 individual whose misdeeds were difficult to contain
 within the state's framework of justice and security.
 The case highlights people's doubts about the func
 tioning of the state and their willingness to take drastic
 measures to impose their own normative order. At the
 same time, it shows that such dissatisfaction does not
 always turn into private justice, but can be controlled
 as well if state officials show a clear presence.
 For decades, Malisani had been terrorizing Goron
 gosa district through his repeated acts of theft, and for
 his brutality in serial acts of rape of women, and aggres
 sion against men he murdered using machetes with
 little or no provocation. He had been in and out of the
 district jail over a period of ten years. In the popular
 imagination, Malisani was not an ordinary man, but a
 profoundly anti-social individual, described variously
 as a thief, a witch, and a psychopath'. In popular
 descriptions, Malisani was not this way by nature, but
 had become like this over time through the dark and
 corrupting forces of powerful substances or 'drogai
 which he sought out to increase his own individual
 power and wealth. These substances allowed him to
 evade capture by the police, or to disappear from jail
 even under close scrutiny. People told stories of police
 officers in pursuit of Malisani whose guns mysteriously
 faltered or even dropped from their hands when they
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 took aim at him. Though the police did manage to
 apprehend him from time to time, whenever he was
 captured, he managed swift, mysterious escapes. And
 whenever Malisani was out of jail, word of his presence
 in the community spread like wildfire and residents
 lived in fear of him.
 Thieves like Malisani are seen by many as the quin
 tessential embodiment of evil. In the Ugandan context,
 Heald has argued that theft and witchcraft 'can be seen
 as related to a similar dispositional base' (Heald 1986:
 68). Thieves are often feared not only for depriving
 people of their property, but also for using violence and
 witchcraft to achieve their nefarious activities.16
 Likewise, witches are feared for their power to bring
 misfortune, which, amongst others, might also include
 deprivation of material property. Lynching in rural
 areas often takes place against such suspected witches
 and is often carried out by relatives (cf. Serra 2009).
 One day in early 2008, after having escaped from
 prison a few weeks earlier and continuing to terrorize
 the residents of the district, the police received a tip
 that Malisani had been seen drinking at a party. A
 group of police officers quickly descended on the event,
 initiating a prolonged manhunt through the neighbor
 hoods of the district capital. Finally cornering Malisani,
 one police officer took aim, firing three shots into his
 thigh. Minutes after a police vehicle dropped Malisani s
 unconscious body at the district hospital for treatment,
 a crowd of area residents had already gathered outside
 the hospital gates to gaze at the spectacle of uniformed
 police officers standing over Malisani's sweaty, gritty,
 and unconscious body lying in handcuffs on the front
 steps. The crowd of onlookers grew rapidly. People
 shared their different stories of his horrible deeds and
 stared in disbelief at the powerful man who had been
 captured once again.
 A predominant element of the crowd's discussion
 was a desire to see Malisani die. Given this prevailing
 mood, it seemed that little would prevent a resort to
 collective violence to impose justice on Malisani. Many
 shared the sentiment that if they had been the
 policeman holding the gun they would have aimed
 elsewhere to finish Malisani off. They complained
 about human rights ethics that led the officers to simply
 shoot him in the leg. Yet, people's actions were contained
 since Malisani was in the hands of the police.
 Malisani's case illustrates a typical scenario of a
 criminal who is feared as a danger to society, and whose
 powers are held to allow him to successfully evade the
 state's system ofjustice for many years. Because Malisani
 is understood to possess powers that the state justice
 system cannot or will not deal with appropriately, indi
 viduals like him bring the justice system into question
 on a more fundamental level beyond simply suspicions
 of police corruption. Such questioning incites frustrated
 citizens to take justice into their own hands, especially
 when the targeted individual is deemed to have posses
 sion of dangerous powers. It is especially in contexts in
 which there is a collectively shared feeling of socio
 economic and criminal injustices that thieves and
 witches run the risk of becoming the target of acts of
 private justice, especially when the police are absent.
 In the case presented here, the public did not take
 more dramatic steps to counteract the threats with
 which they saw themselves confronted. However, in
 the case of Chimoio, people did not hesitate to use
 violence, even at the police station itself. Celestino and
 his neighbors started to impose justice with their own
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 hands but refrained from taking the most drastic steps.
 Why do people resort to violence in the one case and
 not in the other? It is our conviction that it is often
 small triggers which incite people to resort to 'self
 help'. Some factors, however, are worth mentioning
 here as contributing to the phenomenon. First of all,
 the size of a community seems to play a role: large
 scale riots thus far have taken place mainly in the major
 urban centers, which have also been the location of
 most of the acts of lynching against suspected crimi
 nals. The larger a community is, the less multiplex are
 social relations and the less important it becomes to
 maintain social relationships during conflicts (see
 Gluckman 1955; Gulliver 1979). Drastic measures
 which fully disrupt social relations therefore might
 become more likely. Secondly, the gap between rich
 and poor is often more dramatically visible in bigger
 cities. Armed banditry and theft are often more rife in
 these contexts and people are faced with fears on a
 more regular basis. One informant explained to us
 about lynching in the cities:
 It is not one person - or two or three - like in
 Gorongosa where people are not used to it ... [In
 the city], when it started,... people also did not kill.
 If they caught a thief, they took him to the police.
 Only when they realized that people taken to the
 police did not remain in prison, but got out, there
 was no other option [than to resort to lynchings].
 Higher prevalence of theft in the cities also increases
 people's levels of interactions with the police. If such
 experiences are negative, they reduce people's trust in
 the state, as the quote shows.
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 An advantage for the perpetrators of most acts of
 violence is that they are carried out by large groups of
 relatively anonymous individuals that are minimally
 organized. Upon investigation, police officers usually
 encounter silence. Hence they are typically unable to
 identify individual culprits. Further, since the victims of
 such violence are usually not well-connected to the
 higher echelons of society and are mainly considered to
 be causing problems, policemen often allow such cases
 to go uninvestigated. In a situation where outward
 opposition to the government can lead to defamation
 and the loss of possibilities for civil service employment
 or other benefits that accrue with demonstrations of
 loyalty to the ruling party, both of these factors combine
 to make non-state violence a form of protest that is
 'safer' than other visible forms of activism and civil
 disobedience.
 The state: seeking partnerships to curb
 the violence
 Black has argued that '[c]rimes of self-help are more
 likely where law is less available' (Black 1983: 41).
 Reflecting on the violence, one of Gorongosa's local
 state officials explained to us:
 You know why this happens? It is because of that
 thing called 'social contract'. The state institutions
 arose on the basis of the social contract. Society
 gives the state the power to resolve social problems...
 In my opinion, there is a breakdown, a problem of
 loss of moral values and the rise of distrust between
 the legal institutions and society.
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 One strategy the state is exploring to regain control
 and order in society and diminish violence, is to seek
 partnerships with other, more established authorities.
 These actions show that government leaders recognize
 that the state is not the only source of law and morality.
 Due to the low level of organization, fluidity and
 anonymity, the ad hoc organizers of violent protests and
 private justice are difficult for the state to influence in a
 direct manner. Partnerships with other authorities,
 such as religious leaders and spirit mediums might be
 beneficial to reach the population in an indirect manner.
 Given the legitimacy many religious leaders and
 spirit mediums have in the eyes of their followers, they
 are well-equipped to function as a source of normative
 orientations for people, but also for the state itself.
 Without necessarily resorting to violence, these
 authorities have 'lawmaking and law-preserving capac
 ities', providing people with moral messages. Mobi
 lizing them is a way for the state to reduce the possi
 bility that citizens resort to violence. For many years
 however, the relationship with these authorities has
 been tense; the post-independence Frelimo govern
 ment strongly rejected religious expressions of any kind
 as 'obscurantism'. In recent years, a certain degree of
 rapprochement can be noted. In the following, we show
 that the state is currently seeking cooperation with
 religious leaders. Our focus is mainly on Christianity
 and traditional religion since these were the religious
 practices most prevalent in Gorongosa.
 The state arid Christian leaders
 Immediately following the Chimoio riots in 2008, and
 in the midst of a growing wave of incidents of protests
 and popular justice around the country, the district
 administrator of Gorongosa called a meeting of pastors
 of local churches to urge them to include messages of
 peace and reconciliation in their Sunday worship
 services, in an attempt to stave off what seemed to be a
 movement of public unrest that was rapidly sweeping
 the country. He clearly emphasized the need for coop
 eration between church and state, showing awareness
 that the state could benefit from the church. He started
 his speech as follows:
 I have come to talk with the leaders of the churches
 so that my message can reach many tables ... The
 church has friendship with government. The church
 helps government. As the fruit of independence, the
 State is now open. We have to be united and fight
 common problems as one. Today we are here to
 address some difficulties. There are some problems
 in our country. ... Therefore, we are here to ask the
 leaders of the respective churches to spread a
 message of peace. The administrator [he was
 speaking reflexively] cannot solve this on his own,
 we have to sit down and solve together. Our society
 should not use any violence.
 The meeting underlined the administrator's awareness
 that religious leaders are able to influence people's
 behavior and the moral values to which they adhere.
 Hence, in our legal pluralist perspective, they can have
 lawmaking and law-preserving capacities. Looking at
 Gorongosa, religion indeed seems to have these capac
 ities. Church sermons are loaded with moral messages
 on how to behave and many people claim to be directed
 in their lives by their religious beliefs. Several secular
 authorities in Gorongosa stated there was a clear differ
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 enee between people 'from church' and 'people from the
 world', the former category being guided by biblical
 rules of conduct and therefore, according to these
 authorities, knowing how to behave properly (Jacobs
 2010).
 Does Christianity indeed guide people's day-to-day
 behavior in Gorongosa? The district's doctor, who
 treated the shot wounds of Malisani, and a Christian
 himself, reveals this to be the case. During the treat
 ment, countless people approached him pleading that
 he should poison Malisani. But the doctor refused
 their requests. He explained to us that Malisani is a
 despicable man. He did not have any sympathy for
 him, especially since he personally had to treat six of
 Malisani's rape victims in the second half of 2007, five
 of them being hiv+ as a result. But, he explained, 'it is
 not in my ability to make choices about the life or
 death of anyone, even the most depraved,' and he
 added, 'as a Catholic man, I am bound to leave this up
 to God.'Thus, the rule of'God's law' indeed serves as
 a source of moral orientation and can contribute to
 order in society. As the doctor's example shows,
 government leaders' outreach to religious leaders can
 indeed be a fruitful strategy for the state to indirectly
 influence the behavior of the population.
 The state and spirit mediums
 Another category of religious leaders to whom state
 officials have been reaching out is spirit mediums (or
 'traditional healers'). Cooperation between the state
 and spirit mediums is often crucial in cases that involve
 accusations of witchcraft or the actions of spirits. Spirit
 mediums are thought to be able to give a verdict
 regarding the truth or falsity of such accusations and
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 subsequently provide adequate treatments to neutralize
 the forces at play.
 Although the Mozambican state is gradually giving
 more leeway to spirit mediums, the relationship remains
 minimally formalized. The legal recognition of spirit
 mediums is mainly based on their capacities to provide
 natural medicines in cases of physical illnesses. The
 extent to which spirit mediums are recognized for their
 truth finding and conflict resolution capacities in cases
 of witchcraft is still largely dependent on the position
 taken by individual state officers. In their official
 position, police officers cannot take witchcraft accusa
 tions seriously, but as members of Mozambican society,
 they often consider such claims to be legitimate and
 based in reality (cf. Geschiere 2008). Many officials are
 reluctant to delegate power to other authorities whose
 claims are difficult to verify. In cases concerning witch
 craft accusations or claims based on spiritual evidence,
 state officials often have no other choice than to rely on
 spirit mediums. Usually, they do so in an indirect way:
 by referring people to the community courts. These
 courts have been established by the government (Law
 no. 4/92), but do not fall within the state's judicial
 framework (Trindade and Pedroso 2006). Hence, they
 have more 'room for maneuver' and are able to take
 witchcraft accusations into account. This legally plural
 system allows the state to cooperate in an indirect
 manner with the spirit mediums. As one of the local
 Frelimo party officials told us, '[witchcraft is some
 thing which in official judgment cannot be proved, but
 the community courts can work together with spirit
 mediums... This helps to avoid the problem of justice
 with people's own hands.'
 Over the years, state authorities have sought more
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 cooperation to tighten control over the spirit mediums
 and not lose out vis-à-vis non-state actors seeking more
 drastic measures of maintaining order. A good indica
 tion of this can be found in the attribution of office
 space to spirit mediums' associations within the
 premises of the local Frelimo office. Frelimo, it is
 important to recall, is seen by many as synonymous
 with 'the state'. A local party official explained this in
 the following way:
 The party has a purpose: that the people are organ
 ized. This can be done in associations. Therefore,
 sometimes, the party offers meeting space for asso
 ciations which do not have one, to help them with
 their activities.
 Asked in which way Frelimo could benefit from this,
 the official turned to the perspective of the state -
 indicative that the two largely coincide - and argued:
 In a way, they are partners of the government... We
 pamper ... associations because then it is easier for
 the government to work together with different
 groups to reach the people ... The associations work
 with the population which the government does as
 well.
 Apart from indirect cooperation with spirit mediums
 via the community courts, the cooperation between
 Frelimo and the spirit mediums' associations can be
 seen as another effort to increase control over other
 authorities who might otherwise take their lawmaking
 and law-preserving capacities in a direction which is
 not desired by the state.
 Despite this indirect cooperation, the relationship
 between spirit mediums and state officials remains tense
 and uncomfortable. This is especially true when it comes
 to differences in opinion regarding appropriate punish
 ment, particularly in instances when spirit mediums
 resort to corporal - and hence, extralegal - punishment.
 Such measures cannot openly be accepted by the state,
 even though they might contribute to the maintenance
 of order. In one such case, the district court found one of
 the district's most reputed spirit mediums to be guilty of
 torturing a woman he suspected of witchcraft. As a
 result of this torture, the woman was partially crippled.
 The medium spent a week in jail before he was released
 on bail. While in prison, he lamented: 'it doesn't make
 sense ... they leave the witchcraft out there and put me
 in jail, when I am doing work to clean the community of
 these things!' He clearly saw himself as providing a
 noble service for the community; maintaining order by
 harshly condemning and punishing an alleged witch. In
 similar terms, in the Gisu context of Uganda Heald
 argued that 'the killing of both witches and thieves is
 not only regarded as justifiable ... but is also positively
 acclaimed as a service to the community' (Heald 1986:
 66), which underlines that order in society can have
 sources other than the state.
 Ways forward: 'Change the cause to
 change the consequences'
 In the following, we turn to the question of whether
 the state, since the riots in 2008, has found ways to curb
 violence and regain control, or to use Azagaia's words
 from the beginning of this article: whether the state has
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 been able to change the cause to change the conse
 quences'.
 Indicatively, despite efforts to sensitize the popula
 tion via religious leaders, and despite fuel subsidies,
 new demonstrations took place in Maputo in September
 2010. This time, the trigger that led people to take to
 the streets and block the roads were almost simulta
 neous price increases for numerous basic consumer
 goods including bread, rice, water, and electricity. Just
 as in the 'chapa strike', these so-called 'bread riots' were
 violent, as was the response of the army and the police.
 After three days of demonstrations, thirteen people
 were reportedly killed, over 300 injured, and more than
 200 people had been arrested (Mozambique 168,8 Sept.
 2010, ed. Hanlon). Apparently, the causes had not (yet)
 been sufficiently changed in the eyes of the public.
 As a response to the events, in early 2011, the
 government announced a subsidy to be given to the
 urban poor, enabling them to buy a package of subsist
 ence food at a set price. The violence, although being
 extralegal, hence had an influence on government
 policy. The first phase of the program is slated to run
 from June to December 2011.17 It is remarkable to
 point out that the proposed subsidies will be available
 only to people living in urban areas, and not to the
 majority of Mozambicans who live in rural areas. Most
 likely, it is not coincidental that urban areas have been
 the centre of the most visible and large scale incidents
 of violent protests and vigilante justice: these are the
 areas where the government feels urged to provide
 people with more socio-economic security; almost
 literally panem et circenses to keep people quiet. Thus far,
 the promise of the subsidies has effectively curbed the
 emergence of more violent protests, but as of writing
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 (early August) subsidies have not yet been provided.
 Many people have begun to feel that the subsidies will
 remain a promise, making further protests unavoidable
 in the future. Reflecting on the situation, an informant
 told us: '[y]ou know, all this, one day will create a huge
 strike! And the consequences will be really grave!'
 Clearly, the state s claim to a monopoly of violence is
 not taken for granted by the population.
 Conclusion
 In this paper we have shown that violent acts of both
 private justice and public protest in Mozambique can
 be understood as a response to the insecurity and injus
 tice people experience in their daily lives and for which
 they hold the state accountable. Citizens' subjective and
 visible acts of violence can be seen as an attempt to
 correct for the objective violence of the state and to
 impose order (cf. Martins 1995; Abrahams 1998; Von
 Benda-Beckmann and Pirie 2007; Zizek 2008). In a
 context in which people feel, as the local state official
 explained to us, that the social contract between
 them and the state is broken, violence might become a
 natural datum' (Benjamin 2004: 237). We have shown
 that, from a legal pluralist perspective, extralegal violence
 such as the protests and private justice can be perceived
 as having lawmaking and law-preserving capacities.
 Violence then serves to impose either the laws and the
 ideas of justice of the people, or to apply people's own
 procedures for imposing state law. It is our contention
 that as long as people experience insecurity or injustice,
 acts of violent popular justice and protests will continue
 to emerge, even with only minimal organization. This
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 situation urges the state to respond with other forms of
 subjective violence in order to regain control and rees
 tablish its claimed monopoly over the use of violence.
 This will happen especially in spaces of insecurity 'at the
 margins of the state' (Das and Poole 2004), where
 people have little trust in the state and where other
 sovereignties take over (cf. Bertelsen 2009) to substitute
 for the state's provision of justice and security.
 The challenge for the state is to find ways to reassert
 its claim to the monopoly on the use of violence and to
 regain control over the population. One of the
 approaches the state has explored to achieve this end, is
 to seek cooperation with other authorities such as reli
 gious leaders and spirit mediums whose power is based
 in parallel legal systems. In contrast to people engaging
 in private justice and public protests, these authorities
 are able to engage in the making and preservation of
 law in a more organized manner, without necessarily
 resorting to violence. Due to their relatively high levels
 of legitimacy, these authorities are better equipped than
 the state to influence people's moral orientations and
 thus the extent to which they are willing to observe the
 law, apply their own laws, or follow their own proce
 dures to preserve state law. However, the state's coop
 eration initiatives remain largely ad hoc and vary greatly
 between regions.
 Meanwhile demand for radical change is becoming
 stronger and stronger in Mozambique. The future will
 show whether the heading in a recent editorial of one
 of the leading newspapers will be answered 'What will
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 Notes
 1 Colloquial indication for the mini-buses that serve as semi
 public transport.
 2 Our translation from the song 'Povo no poder' from an album
 with the same title, released by Cotonete Records. We would
 like to thank Gonfalo Santos for advice on the translation.
 3 http://allafrica.com/stories/200904220686.html. Attorney
 General Reports Drop in Recorded Crime. April 22, 2009,
 retrieved April 23,2009.
 4 http://allafrica.com/stories/201005050991.html. Mob Justice
 Killed 78 People in 2009. May 5,2010, retrieved May 6,2009.
 5 The Mozambican government was uncomfortable with this
 artistic expression of public protest and banned the song from
 the national media. Nevertheless, it became widely popular.
 Significantly, Azagaia was thoroughly questioned by the coun
 try's general attorney about his motives to write the song (O
 Pais, 28 April, 2009).
 6 Chapa is the nationally used term which refers to the mini
 buses that serve as public transport.
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 7 http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/
 aim355.html#story2. Fuel Subsidy to Defuse Price Hike Riots,
 Mozambique News Agency Reports No.355, February 25,
 2008, retrieved September 12,2008.
 8 Ibid.
 9 Ibid.
 10 See Hanlon (1991, 1997) and Pitcher (2002) for a critical
 evaluation of the neoliberal policy. Hanlon (1997:5), although
 not very explicit, links the violent acts of justice to the socio
 economic situation. Hanlon and Smart (2008) convincingly
 argue that economic growth in Mozambique, measured in
 macro-economic terms, does not imply 'development' or
 improved quality of life for the whole population.
 11 According to the undp Human Development Report 2007
 2008, Mozambique received $1285.9 million as official
 development assistance - more foreign aid than all but twelve
 other countries in the world.
 12 Based on personal observations and interviews in Chimoio
 that day.
 13 District courts are the lowest level state courts. On the level
 below the district courts are the community courts or neigh
 bourhood courts. Although their existence has been decreed by
 the government, they are formally not considered as part of the
 state's structure of justice (Santos 2006). Community courts
 operate fully with elected lay judges, whereas district courts are
 presided by people with a legal training, assisted by two to five
 elected lay judges.
 14 Significantly, in Amnesty International's annual report of 2011,
 the police were accused of being the principal violators of
 human rights in Mozambique, and of engaging in criminal
 activities such as assault, robbery, extortion and murder. The
 report was widely discussed in Mozambican popular media.
 15 For various reasons, the police station is a place of first resort
 for people who seek intervention by one of the statutory
 authorities: the police station in town is always open, it is easily
 accessible, and people formally do not pay a fee to have their
 case considered. From the police station, cases might be trans
 ferred to the district court, which people typically attend only
 by referral as it is considered less open.
 16 See Bertelsen (2009) for a description of a case of a thief using
 magi l substances in the adjacent town of Chimoio.
 17 ttp://allafrica.com/stories/201104140236.html. Govt Alters
 Criteria for Allocating Food Subsidy, April 13,2011, retrieved
 May 29,2011.
 18 http://www.canalmoz.co.mz/hoje/19673-a-bomba-esta
 pr nta.html. Qual Sera o Detonador? A "Bomba"Està Pronta,
 June 17,2011 retrieved June 30,2011.
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